Τρίτη, 22 Αυγούστου 2017

Same Old Madness: v.a. Διαταραξη Κοινης Ησυχιας LP 1984

Same Old Madness: v.a. Διαταραξη Κοινης Ησυχιας LP 1984: vinyl rip here

Άνθος του Κακού: Τα αναρχικά [Τόλης Νικηφόρου]

Άνθος του Κακού: Τα αναρχικά [Τόλης Νικηφόρου]



Τόλης Νικηφόρου
Τα αναρχικά, 1979
ένα παιδί 



με το πρόσωπο κολλημένο στο τζάμι

κοιτάζω εκστατικά

πίσω απ’ τις στάλες της βροχής

ένα πολύχρωμο κόσμο



κρύβω μέσα μου ένα παιδί

με τις τσέπες γεμάτες μπίλιες

μέσα στον χειμώνα

ένα παιδί με δακρυσμένα μάτια

για το γατάκι του που πέθανε

για το λουλούδι που μαράθηκε

για όσους έφυγαν χωρίς επιστροφή



κρύβω μέσα μου ένα παιδί

με τρύπιο παλτό

που λαχταράει τα ζεστά κάστανα

τη γειτονιά και τους φίλους

την άνοιξη που θάρθει



κρύβω μέσα μου ένα παιδί

που δεν δέχεται

πως μπορεί να γελάω

όταν την ίδια στιγμή κάποιος κλαίει



κρύβω μέσα μου ένα παιδί

απαρηγόρητο

που θάθελε να φτιάξει τη ζωή

στα μέτρα της καρδιάς του
εμείς 



εμείς

δεν έχουμε παρά ένα φλογισμένο όραμα

ένα όραμα ασυμβίβαστο

εμείς

δεν διστάζουμε να μιλήσουμε την αλήθεια

που καρφώνει τη σημαία της 

πάνω στο πτώμα του φόβου

εμείς 

γεννηθήκαμε πριν τον καιρό μας

για να φέρουμε τον καιρό μας στο σήμερα

εμείς

δεν έχουμε παρά ένα τραχύ ρούχο

κόκκινο και μαύρο

να μας κεντρίζει το στήθος 

στο σημείο της καρδιάς

ένα ρούχο που σημαίνει 

ελευθερία
χρέος 



χρωστάμε μόνον 

σε κείνους που πολύ αγάπησαν

και ζήσανε την πίκρα

χρωστάμε μόνον 

σε κείνους που πολύ αγωνίστηκαν 

και ζήσανε την ήττα

χρωστάμε μόνον

σε κείνους που πολύ ονειρεύτηκαν 

και ζήσανε τον εφιάλτη

χρωστάμε μόνον 

σε κείνους που περιφρονήσανε τον θάνατο

και πέθαναν

κι είναι νεκροί

κι ανθίζουν 

και μυρώνουνε το χώμα



χρωστάμε μόνον 

το φως του κόσμου
μια περίπτωση 



ο παιδικός μου φίλος

είχε κοινή καρδιά ρομαντική

ένα ψυχρό σταλινικό μυαλό

μια φλογερή ψυχή αναρχική 

σαράντα χρόνια στο καμίνι της ασφάλτου



άντε να πορευτεί μετά 

και νάχει η πράξη του συνέπεια
εγώ 



μη με κοιτάτε έτσι χλωμό

καλοντυμένο

με τρόπους άνετους και με κινήσεις

από το σπίτι στο γραφείο

απ' το γραφείο στο σπίτι

σε μάταιο κύκλο ερμητικά κλεισμένο



μη με κοιτάτε έτσι δειλό

με το σημάδι του γραφιά στο δάχτυλο

με τον μισθό στην πρώτη και στις δεκαπέντε

ανίδεο 

ή με τη γνώση υποταγμένη



εγώ 

κρύβω στα μάτια μου οράματα που οδηγούν

σε τόπους και καιρούς που θάρθουν



εγώ 

μπορώ με μια φωνή 

να πλημμυρίσω τις πλατείες

τους δρόμους με σημαίες και λάβαρα

με μια βουή ασυγκράτητη που καταλύει τα πάντα



η φαντασία μου εξουσιάζει τη ζωή σας
μαγεμένη ψυχή 



σ' αγάπησα

σε σκονισμένες γειτονιές και εργοστάσια

στην άχρωμη επιφάνεια του μπετόν



πίσω από οδοφράγματα σ' αγάπησα

σε συγκεντρώσεις απεργών

σε διαδηλώσεις φοιτητών

στους διαδρόμους των δικαστηρίων



σε μυστικές συνεδριάσεις της νύχτας

είναι γραμμένο τ' όνομά σου

στις προκηρύξεις που μοιράσαμε

στις κόκκινες αφίσες που κολλήσαμε

και στα αρχεία των τμημάτων ασφαλείας



σ' αγάπησα, σύντροφέ μου,

η μαγεμένη σου ψυχή είναι δική μου

η αγωνία σου μου ανήκει

Παρασκευή, 27 Δεκεμβρίου 2013

Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Four Causes @tlcierny | philosophy readings

<post reading=”Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Four Causes”>
<ref title=”Aristotle’s Doctrine of the Four Causes” atUrl=”http://www.unc.edu/~tlcierny/fourcauses.html” pageUpdated=”20091022″ pageAccessed=”20131227″ >
<coppied format=”richText”>

The Four Causes


What are there four of?

  1. Aristotle’s doctrine of the four causes is crucial, but easily misunderstood.
    It is natural for us (post-Humeans) to think of (what Aristotle calls) “causes”
    in terms of our latter-day notion of cause-and-effect. This is misleading
    in several ways:
    1. Only one of Aristotle’s causes (the “efficient” cause) sounds even remotely
      like a Humean cause.
    2. Humean causes are events, and so are their effects, but Aristotle
      doesn’t limit his causes in that way. Typically, it is substances
      that have causes. And that sounds odd.
  2. But to charge Aristotle with having only a dim understanding of causality
    is to accuse him of missing a target he wasn’t even aiming at. We must keep
    this in mind whenever we use the word “cause” in connection with Aristotle’s
    doctrine.
  3. We will begin with the question, What is it that Aristotle says there are four of? The Greek word is aition
    (plural aitia); sometimes it takes a feminine form, aitia (plural
    aitiai). And what is an aition? Part of Aristotle’s point is
    that there is no one answer to this question.An aition is just whatever one can cite in answer to a “why?” question.
    And what we give in answering a “why?” question is an explanation. So an
    aition is best thought of as an explanation than as a cause.
  4. Even so, that’s not enough. First, Aristotle thinks that you can ask what the aitia of this table are, and it’s
    not clear what sense, if any, it makes to ask for an explanation of the table. Second, he
    thinks that, in some sense, a carpenter is an aition of a table, and it’s not clear in
    what sense, if any, a carpenter (or anything like a carpenter) could be an explanation of
    anything.Here perhaps Ackrill’s “explanatory factor” is a more illuminating translation of
    aition. That is, an aition is something that plays a role as an explanatory
    factor in the explanation of something. But, as we’ll see, there are many kinds of explanations.

Where to find the doctrine in Aristotle’s texts

  1. In RAGP: Phys. II.3; and (extensively) in Metaph. A.3
    ff. See also Part. An. 639b12ff
  2. Additionally (not in RAGP): APo. II.11; Metaph. D.2;
    Gen. et Corr. 335a28-336a12.

The traditional picture

The picture is Aristotle’s, but the names of the causes are not. Quotations from Physics II.3, 194b24 ff:
  1. Material cause:“that from which, <as a constituent> present in it, a thing comes to be … e.g., the bronze and silver, and their genera, are causes of the statue and the bowl.”
  2. Formal cause:“the form, i.e., the pattern … the form is the account of the essence … and the parts of the account.”
  3. Efficient cause:“the source of the primary principle of change or stability,” e.g., the man who gives advice, the father (of the child). “The producer is a cause of the product, and the initiator of the change is a cause of what is changed.”
  4. Final cause:“something’s end (telos)—i.e., what it is for—is its cause, as health is <the cause> of walking.”
This account makes it seem as if Aristotle is offering a catalog of causes, and is claiming that
each thing has four different kinds of cause. But what the account misses is the idea that there
is something ambiguous about the notion of aition.

The ambiguity of aition

Aristotle warns us of the ambiguity at 195a5: “aition is said in many ways.” This is his usual formula for telling us that a term is being used ambiguously.
That is, when one says that
x is the aition of y, it isn’t clear what is meant until
one specifies what sense of aition is intended:
  1. x is what y is [made] out of.
  2. x is what it is to be y.
  3. x is what produces y.
  4. x is what y is for.
This makes it hard for us to get clear on what Aristotle was up to, since
neither “cause” nor “explanation” is ambiguous in the way Aristotle claims
aition is. There is no English translation of aition
that is ambiguous in the way (Aristotle claims) aition is. But if
we shift from the noun “cause” to the verb “makes” we may get somewhere.

The ambiguity of makes

Aristotle’s point may be put this way: if we ask “what makes something
so-and-so?” we can give four very different sorts of answer - each appropriate
to a different sense of “makes.” Consider the following sentences:
  1. The table is made of wood.
  2. Having four legs and a flat top makes this (count as) a table.
  3. A carpenter makes a table.
  4. Having a surface suitable for eating or writing makes this (work as) a table.
Aristotelian versions of (1) - (4):
1a.  Wood is an aition of a table.
2a.  Having four legs and a flat top is an aition of a table.
3a.  A carpenter is an aition of a table.
4a.  Having a surface suitable for eating or writing is an
aition of a table.
These sentences can be disambiguated by specifying the relevant sense of
aition in each case:
1b.  Wood is what the table is made out of.
2b.  Having four legs and a flat top is what it is to be a table.
3b.  A carpenter is what produces a table.
4b.  Eating on and writing on is what a table is for.

Static vs. Dynamic Causes

Matter and form are two of the four causes, or explanatory factors. They
are used to analyze the world statically - they tell us how it is
at a given moment. But they do not tell us how it came to be that way.
For that we need to look at things dynamically - we need to look at
causes that explain why matter has come to be formed in the way that it has.
Change consists in matter taking on (or losing) form. Efficient and final
causes are used to explain why change occurs.
This is easiest to see in the case of an artifact, like a statue or a table.
The table has come into existence because the carpenter put the form of the
table (which he had in his mind) into the wood of which the table is
composed.
The carpenter has done this for the purpose of creating something he can
write on or eat on. (Or, more likely, that he can sell to someone who wants
it for that purpose.) This is a teleological explanation of there
being a table.
This seems like a plausible doctrine about artifacts : they can be explained both statically (what they are, and what they’re made of) and dynamically (how they came to be, and what they are for).

Causes of natural objects

But what about natural objects? Aristotle (notoriously) held that
the four causes could be found in nature, as well. That is, that there is
a final cause of a tree, just as there is a final cause of a table.
Here he is commonly thought to have made a huge mistake. How can there be
final causes in nature, when final causes are purposes, what
a thing is for? In the case of an artifact, the final cause is the
end or goal that the artisan had in mind in making the thing.
But what is the final cause of a dog, or a horse, or an oak tree?
  1. What they are used for? E.g., pets, pulling plows, serving as building materials,
    etc. To suppose so would be to suppose Aristotle guilty of reading
    human purposes and plans into nature. But this is not what he has
    in mind.
  2. Perhaps he thinks of nature as being like art, except that the artisan is
    God? God is the efficient cause of natural objects, and God’s purposes are
    the final causes of the natural objects that he creates.
No. In both (a) and (b), the final cause is external to the object.
(Both the artisan and God are external to their artifacts; they impose form
on matter from the outside.) But the final causes of natural objects are
internal to those objects.

Final causes in nature

  1. The final cause of a natural object - a plant or an animal - is
    not a purpose, plan, or “intention.” Rather, it is whatever lies at
    the end of the regular series of developmental changes that typical
    specimens of a given species undergo.The final cause need not be a purpose that someone has in mind.I.e., where F is a biological kind: the telos of an F
    is what embryonic, immature, or developing Fs are all tending to grow
    into. The telos of a developing tiger is to be a tiger.
  2. Aristotle opposes final causes in nature to chance or
    randomness. So the fact that there is regularity in nature - as Aristotle
    says, things in nature happen “always or for the most part” - suggests to
    him that biological individuals run true to form. So this end, which
    developing individuals regularly achieve, is what they are “aiming at.”Thus, for a natural object, the final cause is typically identified
    with the formal cause. The final cause of a developing plant or animal
    is the form it will ultimately achieve, the form into which it grows
    and develops.References: Physics 198a25, 199a31, De Anima 415b10, Generation of Animals
    715a4ff.
  3. This helps to explain why “form, mover, and telos often coincide,” as
    Aristotle says (198a25). I.e., why one and the same thing can serve as three of the causes - formal, efficient, and
    final.The telos of a (developing) tiger is just (to be) a tiger (i.e. to
    be an animal with the characteristics specified in the definition of a tiger).
    Thus, the final cause (telos) and formal cause (essence) amount to the same thing.
    And Aristotle also says that a source of natural change (efficient cause) is “a thing’s
    form, or what it is, for that is its end and what it is for” (198b3). Hence,
    one and the same thing serves as formal, final, and efficient cause.Claims like “a tiger is for the sake of a tiger” or “an apple tree is for
    the sake of an apple tree” sound vacuous. But the identification of formal
    with final causes is not vacuous. It is to say, about a developing entity,
    that there is something internal to it which will have the result that
    the outcome of the sequence of changes it is undergoing
    - if it runs
    true to form
    - will be another entity of the same kind - a tiger,
    or an apple tree.
  4. So form and telos coincide. What about the efficient cause?
    The internal factor which accounts for this cub’s growing up to be a tiger
    (a) has causal efficacy, and (b) was itself contributed by a tiger (i.e.
    the cub’s father).This can be more easily grasped if we realize that for Aristotle questions
    about causes in nature are raised about universals. Hence, the answers
    to these questions will also be given in terms of universals. The questions
    that ask for formal, final, and efficient causes, respectively, are:
    1. What kind of thing do these flesh-and-bones constitute?
    2. What has this (seed, embryo, cub) all along been developing into?
    3. What produces a tiger?
    The answer to all three questions is the same: “a tiger.” It is in this sense
    that these three causes coincide.
  5. Aristotle’s account of animal reproduction makes use of just these points
    (cf. GA I.21, II.9 and Metaph. Z.7-9):
    1. The basic idea (as in all change) is that matter takes on form. The form
      is contributed by the male parent (which actually does have the form), the
      matter by the female parent. This matter has the potentiality to be informed
      by precisely that form.
    2. The embryonic substance has the form potentially, and can be “called by the
      same name” as what produces it. (E.g., the embryonic tiger can be called
      a tiger, for that is what it is, potentially at least.) [But there
      are exceptions: the embryonic mule cannot be called by the name of its male
      parent, for that is a horse (1034b3).]
    3. The form does not come into existence. Rather, it must exist beforehand,
      and get imposed on appropriate matter. In the case of the production of
      artifacts, the pre-existing form may exist merely potentially. (E.g., the
      artist has in mind the form he will impose on the clay. Nothing has
      to have the form in actuality.)
    4. But in the case of natural generation, the pre-existing form must exist in
      actuality
      : “there must exist beforehand another actual substance
      which produces it, e.g. an animal must exist beforehand if an animal is produced”
      (1034b17).
  6. So the final cause of a natural substance is its form. But what is the form
    of such a substance like? Is form merely shape, as the word
    suggests? No. For natural objects - living things - form is more complex.
    It has to do with function.We can approach this point by beginning with the case of bodily organs. For
    example, the final cause of an eye is its function, namely, sight.
    That is what an eye is for.And this function, according to Aristotle, is part of the formal cause
    of the thing, as well. Its function tells us what it is. What it is
    to be an eye is to be an organ of sight.To say what a bodily organ is is to say what it does - what
    function it performs. And the function will be one which serves the purpose
    of preserving the organism or enabling it to survive and flourish in its
    environment.Since typical, non-defective, specimens of a biological species do survive
    and flourish, Aristotle takes it that the function of a kind of animal is
    to do what animals of that kind typically do, and as a result of doing
    which they survive, flourish, and reproduce.  Cf. Charlton (Aristotle’s
    Physics
    , p. 102):
    . . . the widest or most general kind of thing which all non-defective members
    of a class can do, which differentiates them from other members of the next
    higher genus, is their function.
  7. To say that there are ends (telê) in nature is not to
    say that nature has a purpose. Aristotle is not seeking some one answer to
    a question like “What is the purpose of nature?” Rather, he is seeking a
    single kind of explanation of the characteristics and behavior of natural
    objects. That is, plants and animals develop and reproduce in regular ways,
    the processes involved (even where not consciously aimed at or deliberated
    about) are all toward certain ends.
  8. There is much that can be said in opposition to such a view. But at least
    it is not ridiculous, as is sometimes supposed. In so far as functional
    explanation still figures in biology, there is a residue of Aristotelian
    teleology in biology. And it has yet to be shown that biology can get along
    without teleological notions. The notions of function, and what something
    is for, are still employed in describing at least some of nature.
</coppied>
</ref>



</tagged>

<ref>https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_Causes</ref>
<ref>See also :( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Four_Causes): Potentiality and actuality</ref>
<ref><catAtWikipedia>
</catAtWikipedia></ref>
<ref format=”richText”><catAtWikipedia><url>Category:Causality<url>
<coppied from=”https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Causality” accessDate=”20131227″>
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Wikimedia Commons has media related to Causality.
The main article for this category is Causality.

Subcategories

This category has the following 12 subcategories, out of 12 total.

C

D

E

F

L

  • Luck‎ (3 C, 38 P)

R

S

T

Pages in category “Causality”

The following 85 pages are in this category, out of 85 total. This list may not reflect recent changes (learn more).

 

A

B

C

D

D cont.

E

F

G

H

I

K

L

M

N

O

P

R

S

T

V

</coppied>
</catAtWikipedia></ref>
<ref for=”causality” at=”PhilPapers” atUrl=”http://philpapers.org/browse/causation-laws-etc” feedUrl=”http://philpapers.org/browse/causation-laws-etc?cId=1359&cn=causation-laws-etc&dg=28391VcastkC9PQ4e8Qtok4mKHv7jJhdt6NfSoYOW3f8FXC&format=rss&new=1&proOnly=on&sort=cat&sqc=on” editedBy=”Helen Beebee | University of Birmingham” coppied_date=”20131227″>
<related_categories of=”causation”>
<partOf>Metaphysics > Causation, Laws, etc</partOf>
<subcategories>:
</subcategories>
<history_traditions of=”Causation, Laws, etc”>
</history_traditions>
</related_categories
</coppied>
</ref>
<ref for=”causality” at=”Indiana Philosophy Ontology” atUrl=”https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/taxonomy/2351“>
<coppied date=”20131227″>

Causation

</coppied>
</ref>
</post>



Enhanced by Zemanta